Mercer Law Review
Volume 55
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 8

12-2003

Domestic Relations
Barry B. McGough
Gregory R. Miller

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
McGough, Barry B. and Miller, Gregory R. (2003) "Domestic Relations," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 55 : No. 1 ,
Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol55/iss1/8

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough*
and
Gregory R. Miller**
Fourteen of the domestic relations appellate cases decided during the
survey period' are digested here. Georgia law requires that appeals of
domestic relations cases occur through the discretionary application
process. A party wanting to appeal an order in a domestic relations
case must first file an application to obtain the appropriate appellate
court's permission to file an appeal.' As part of a pilot project, the
Georgia Supreme Court announced it would accept all "non-frivolous"
applications filed in domestic relations cases during the calendar year
2003. The pilot project does not include cases that would be appealed
first to the court of appeals,' writs of certiorari,6 or interlocutory
appeals.7 While the domestic relations bar hopes the pilot project will
be extended or made permanent, no decision has been announced. The

* Partner in the firm of McGough, Huddleston & Medori, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of California at Berkeley (A.B., 1963); University of California (LL.B., 1966). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of McGough, Huddleston & Medori, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.B.A., 1989); Georgia State University (J.D., 1994). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1. This survey chronicles developments in Georgia domestic relations law from June
1, 2002 to May 31, 2003.
2. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(2) (Supp. 2003).
3. Id. § 5-6-35(b).
4. Wright v. Wright, S03F1141, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 784, at *1-2 (Ga. Sept. 22, 2003).
5. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 2 lists those appeals for which the supreme court has
original jurisdiction, including any questions as to the constitutionality of a statute. GA.
CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 3 lists those appeals for which the supreme court has general
appellate jurisdiction, including judgments for alimony and divorce. GA. CONST. art. VI,
§ 5, para. 3 vests the court of appeals with jurisdiction in those appellate cases not
reserved to the supreme court or other courts.
6. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-15 (1998).
7. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) (1998).
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pilot project, however, has enabled the courts to address a variety of
domestic relations issues.
I.

DIVORCE: PARTIES

The supreme court addressed the issue of who may be named as
parties to a divorce case other than the spouses. In Gardner v.
Gardner,' the supreme court affirmed the trial court's joinder of two
corporate entities in the parties' divorce case. 9 The husband, who filed
for divorce, listed corporate stock in three entities as the only marital
assets of the parties. The husband was the sole stockholder and director
of the three companies, but the corporations held title to the assets that
the parties used, including the marital home and vehicles. Therefore,
the wife filed a counterclaim and a motion to have two of the corporations joined as parties, claiming joinder was necessary to enable the
parties to obtain a complete equitable division of the marital assets. °
Both the trial court and the supreme court agreed."
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-13(h) provides: "When the presence of parties other
than those to the original action is required for the granting of
complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim ... the court
shall order them to be brought in as defendants as provided in this
chapter, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained." 2
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-19(a)(1) states that "'[a] person who is subject to
service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if: (1) [Un his
absence complete relief cannot be afforded among those who are already
parties.'"' 3 Because the husband's companies held title to many of the
parties' assets, the supreme court determined that "complete relief could
only be achieved by joining the corporations as parties to the divorce
action.' 4 However, the supreme court emphasized that the joinder
must be limited to the division of the parties' marital assets. 5

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

276 Ga. 189, 576 S.E.2d 857 (2003).
Id. at 190-91, 576 S.E.2d at 859.
Id. at 189-90, 576 S.E.2d at 858.
Id. at 190-91, 576 S.E.2d at 858-59.
Id. at 190, 576 S.E.2d at 859 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-13(h) (1993)).
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19(a)(1) (1993)).
Id. at 190-91, 576 S.E.2d at 859.
Id. at 191, 576 S.E.2d at 859.
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EQUITABLE DIVISION

Pirani,6

In Barolia v.
the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
determination that it did not have jurisdiction to award an equitable
division of certain marital property.17 The parties were divorced in
Texas, but the decree specifically stated that the now ex-wife did "not
waive her right to an action on the division of property which should be
brought in the state of Georgia."' The ex-husband brought an action
in Georgia to domesticate the Texas decree and to divide the Georgia
property. The ex-wife admitted jurisdiction and filed a counterclaim for
equitable division of the property. On the ex-husband's motion for
summary judgment, the trial court held that entry of the divorce decree
prevented the Georgia court from having jurisdiction to equitably divide
the parties' marital property. The trial court relied on the proposition
that title to property not addressed in the decree remains unaffected by
the entry of the decree, and title remains with the party or parties
having title at the time of the decree.' 9 The court of appeals reversed,
holding that while the trial court correctly stated the law, that
proposition does not apply when the property is addressed in the divorce
decree, and a decision is reserved for later determination. °
III.

CHILD CUSTODY: STANDARD

While trends seem to place reduced importance on spousal misconduct,
particularly in custody cases, the supreme court held that a trial court
could consider such misconduct.2 ' In Patel v. Patel,22 the supreme
court affirmed the trial court's consideration of the cause of the parties'
separation in awarding sole physical custody of the minor children to the
mother.23 The father's adulterous relationship with an employee/patient resulted in the father losing his job and the wife filing for
divorce. The trial court awarded joint legal custody to the parties, but
it awarded sole physical custody to the mother subject to the father's
liberal visitation rights. The father's visitation rights were not restricted

16. 260 Ga. App. 513, 580 S.E.2d 297 (2003).
17. Id. at 513, 580 S.E.2d at 297.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 513-14, 580 S.E.2d at 297-98. See Newborn v. Clay, 263 Ga. 622, 436 S.E.2d
654 (1993).
20. 260 Ga. App. at 514, 580 S.E.2d at 299.
21. Patel v. Patel, 276 Ga. 266, 268, 577 S.E.2d 587, 589 (2003) (citing Mock v. Mock,
258 Ga. 407, 369 S.E.2d 233 (1988)).
22. 276 Ga. 266, 577 S.E.2d 587 (2003).
23. Id. at 268, 577 S.E.2d at 590.
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in any manner to prevent contact between the father's paramour and the
children. 4
While visitation rights will not be deprived unless a parent is unfit,25
custody may be deprived based merely on the "best interests of the child"
standard.
In applying the best interests standard, the trial court is
authorized to consider the parties' conduct during the marriage, 27 even
when the divorce is granted on no fault grounds.28 Construing O.C.G.A.
section 19-9-1(a)(1) 29 with O.C.G.A. section 19-9-3(a)(2),3 ° the supreme
court 3' held that Georgia law "confers a prima facie right on the party
not in default 2 such that the trial court should award custody to that
party, in the absence of proof of circumstances showing that the
children's welfare will be better served by entry of a different award."33
The supreme court, therefore, held that the evidence of the father's
adultery was relevant to the trial court's custody determination.3 4
IV.

CHILD CUSTODY:

MODIFICATION

While the state legislature has yet to pass a bill about the impact of
a parent's relocation on custody arrangements, the supreme court began
addressing the issue. In Scott v. Scott,35 the supreme court held that
an automatic change of custody based on the custodial parent's future
relocation is invalid.3 6 When the parties divorced in 2001, the trial

24. Id. at 266-68, 577 S.E.2d at 587-89; Cf Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 274 Ga. 183,
551 S.E.2d 721 (2001) (prohibiting trial court from restricting visitation in the presence of
certain individuals without a showing that the exposure would harm the child).
25. 276 Ga. at 267, 577 S.E.2d at 589 (citing Woodruff v. Woodruff, 272 Ga. 485, 531
S.E.2d 714 (2000)).
26. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(2) (1999)).
27. Id. at 268, 577 S.E.2d at 589 (citing Mock v. Mock, 258 Ga. 407, 369 S.E.2d 255
(1988)).
28. Id., 577 S.E.2d at 589-90 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1(a)(1) (1999) and Harris v. Harris,
240 Ga. 276, 240 S.E.2d 30 (1977)).
29. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1(a)(1) (1999).
30. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(2) (1999).
31. All justices concurred in the majority opinion, except Justice Carol Hunstein, who
wrote a special concurrence wherein she agreed that the trial court was within its
discretion to consider the evidence of the father's adultery. She disagreed, however, with
the majority's holding that a presumption exists in favor of either party in a custody case,
and that the best interests of the child standard governs. 276 Ga. at 269, 577 S.E.2d at
590 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
32. The supreme court, as in past decisions, seems to equate the phrase "in default"
with the phrase "at fault." Id. at 268, 577 S.E.2d at 589.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 268-69, 577 S.E.2d at 590.
35. 276 Ga. 372, 578 S.E.2d 876 (2003).
36. Id. at 372, 578 S.E.2d at 877.
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court awarded primary physical custody to the mother, but the divorce
decree stated that if the mother relocated outside of the county of her
current residence, custody would revert to the father. The trial court
found that such a move would be a material change of circumstances
affecting the welfare of the parties' child. The provision was to be "selfeffectuating" and required no further court action. 7
Ordinarily, custody provisions are only modifiable by court action.3"
However, the appellate courts have approved self-effectuating custody
changes in the past. In Weaver v. Jones,39 the supreme court approved
an automatic change based on the minor child reaching at least fourteen
years of age and making an election to reside with the noncustodial
parent.'
In Pearce v. Pearce,41 the supreme court enforced an automatic change when the children were not expressly required to reach age
fourteen prior to making the election.42
The supreme court reaffirmed these two decisions, finding them
consistent with existing law.4" Children over the age of fourteen may
elect the parent with whom they choose to reside, and their election will
be binding unless the selected parent is determined to be unfit."
Prior to deciding Weaver and Pearce, the supreme court in Holder v.
Holder4 5 approved a self-effectuating change if the mother remarried.4" In Carr v. Carr,47 the court of appeals approved a provision
changing custody if the mother moved to a different city or state.48 In
Scott the supreme court held that the decisions in Holder and Carrwere
not appropriate extensions of the decisions in Weaver and Pearce.49 The
supreme court repudiated its holding in Holder and disapproved of the
court of appeal's decision in Carr.50

37. Id. at 372-73, 578 S.E.2d at 877-78.
38. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1(b) (1999); O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(b) (1999).
39. 260 Ga. 493, 396 S.E.2d 890 (1980).
40. Id. at 494, 396 S.E.2d at 891.
41.

244 Ga. 69, 257 S.E.2d 904 (1979).

42. Id. at 70, 257 S.E.2d at 905.
43. Scott, 276 Ga. at 373-74, 578 S.E.2d at 878. The dissent points out that the
children in Pearcewere under the age of fourteen when the decree was entered, and thus
the case does not fit squarely within the majority's rationale for upholding Weaver and
Pearcebut not upholding Holder and Carr. Id. at 378-79, 578 S.E.2d at 878-79 (Sears, P.J.,
dissenting).

44.
45.

O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1(a)(3)(A) (1999); O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(4) (1999).
226 Ga. 254, 174 S.E.2d 408 (1970).

46.
47.
48.

Id. at 255, 174 S.E.2d at 409.
207 Ga. App. 611, 429 S.E.2d 95 (1993).
Id. at 611, 429 S.E.2d 96-97.

49.

276 Ga. at 374-75, 578 S.E.2d at 879-80.

50.

Id. at 377, 578 S.E.2d at 881.
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Unlike in Weaver and Pearce, the bases for modifications in Holder
and Carrwere contrary to Georgia law. A modification of child custody
must be predicated upon the finding of a material change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child.5 The appellate courts have
repeatedly held that the remarriage or relocation of the custodial parent
alone is not a change of circumstances." The supreme court further
noted that such events may impact children positively or negatively."
The custodial election of a child over the age of fourteen, on the other
hand, is a proper basis for modifying custody.5
A modification must be based on the facts and circumstances at the
time of modification.5 5 Because the trial court in Scott, like those in
Holder and Carr, based the self-effectuating modification provision on
the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the divorce,
and not
the time of the modification, the modification violated public
56
policy.

V.

CHILD SUPPORT: GUIDELINES
Support Guidelines ("Guidelines")57

Georgia's Child
were the subject
of several appellate decisions. In Georgia Department of Human
Resources ("DHR") v. Sweat,5" the supreme court determined that the
Guidelines were constitutional, reversing the trial court's order finding
otherwise. 9 In Sweat the father was awarded custody when the
parties divorced in 1998, and the mother was not required to pay child
support. In 2000 DHR sought child support on behalf of the father. The
mother successfully argued to the trial court that the Guidelines were
unconstitutional. °
The supreme court held that the trial court erred in concluding that
the Guidelines violated the Georgia and United States Constitutions'
guarantees of substantive due process."' Finding that the Guidelines
do not infringe upon any fundamental rights of the mother, and that the
mother is not a member of any suspect class, the supreme court

51. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1(b) (1999); O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(b) (1999).
52. Scott, 276 Ga. at 374, 376, 578 S.E.2d at 878, 880 (citing Mercer v. Foster, 210 Ga.
546, 81 S.E.2d 458 (1954); Ofchus v. Isom, 239 Ga. App. 738, 521 S.E.2d 871 (1999)).
53. Id. at 376, 578 S.E.2d at 880.
•54. O.C.GA. § 19-9-1(b) (1999); O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(b) (1999).
55. Mallette v. Mallette, 220 Ga. 401, 139 S.E.2d 322 (1964).
56. 276 Ga. at 375, 578 S.E.2d at 879-80.
57. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (1999).
58. 276 Ga. 627, 580 S.E.2d 206 (2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 432 (2003).
59. Id. at 628, 580 S.E.2d at 210.
60. Id. at 627-28, 580 S.E.2d at 209.
61. Id. at 628, 580 S.E.2d at 210.
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determined that the statute need only be rationally related to a
The supreme court classified the
legitimate government concern.
provision of child support to children of divorce as an "important and
highly reasonable objective."63 Further, the Guidelines' consideration
of the payor's income and various enumerated factors warranting
counters the mother's claim that the
departures from the Guidelines
64
Guidelines are arbitrary.
Next, the supreme court determined that the Guidelines did not
violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 65 Custodial and noncustodial parents are not similarly situated
parties.6 6 The custodial parent generally has more involvement in the
day-to-day care of the child than the noncustodial parent. 67 Furthermore, the custodial parent's financial contribution is generally defined
by the needs of the child, whereas the noncustodial parent's contribution
is generally limited by the child support order.6 8
Similarly, the supreme court rejected the argument that the Guidelines violated the mother's right to privacy.69 The court determined
that the mother did not have any privacy rights in the manner in which
her child support was calculated. 0 All child support orders, including
modifications, are subject to the discretion of the appropriate trial courts,
and public policy dictates that children of divorce receive sufficient
support from the parents.71
Finally, the supreme court held that the Guidelines do not result in an
"illegal taking" from the mother.72 The Georgia Constitution prohibits
government taking of private property for public purposes without just
compensation.7 3 However, the Guidelines are not a government taking
but are instead the means to ensure that children of divorce receive
adequate support from the noncustodial parent.74 Furthermore, child

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 629, 580 S.E.2d at 210.
Id., 580 S.E.2d at 210-11.
Id.; see GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2 (1998); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1990).
276 Ga. at 630, 580 S.E.2d at 211.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 631, 580 S.E.2d at 212.
Id.
Id.
Id.
GA. CONST. art. I, § 3, para. 1(a).
Sweat, 276 Ga. at 631, 580 S.E.2d at 212.
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support is not a public purpose because it is unique to the individual
child.75
Compliance with the Guidelines was the subject of Swanson v.
6
Swanson."
The parties reached a mediated settlement of the issues in
their divorce case, including provisions that the mother would accept less
alimony but not be required to pay child support. When the father
refused to have the mediation agreement incorporated into a settlement
agreement, the mother filed a motion to enforce the parties' mediated
agreement. The trial court determined that the parties had reached an
agreement, so it granted the motion to enforce.77 The supreme court
determined that the agreement for the father to receive no child support
in exchange for a reduced alimony payment to the mother was an
impermissible waiver of child support."
Therefore, the mediated
79
agreement was void.
Further, the supreme court reminded trial
courts of their duty of oversight regarding the sufficiency of the support
amount.8 0
The court of appeals also addressed compliance with the procedural
aspects of the Guidelines. In Eldridge v. Ireland,8' the trial court
issued a child support order in a legitimation action. The father worked
for a business owned and run by members of the father's immediate
family. Evidence showed that the father's annual income had decreased
from $50,000 in 1988 to $22,000 at the time of trial. The trial court
determined that the father had an earning capacity of $45,000 per year.
Finding that special circumstances existed, including the father's
suppression of income, the father's reduction of income, and the father's
responsibilities at his family-owned business, the trial court ordered the
father to pay $750 per month8 2 in child support.8 3
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to make
a determination of the father's actual income. 4 Once gross income has
been determined, the trial court is required to determine the amount of
support that is appropriate based on the percentages set forth in the

75. Id.
76. 276 Ga. 566, 580 S.E.2d 526 (2003).
77. Id. at 566-67, 580 S.E.2d at 527.
78. Id. at 567, 580 S.E.2d at 527.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 259 Ga. App. 44, 576 S.E.2d 44 (2002).
82. The guidelines for one child are 17-23% of the payor's gross income. O.C.G.A. § 196-15 (1999). The support award of $750 per month is equal to 20% of the amount the court
determined as the father's earning capacity.
83. Eldridge, 259 Ga. App. at 45, 576 S.E.2d at 45.
84. Id.
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Guidelines."5 Finally, the trial court is required to determine if there
are any special circumstances and whether those circumstances should
affect the amount of the child support.86 Because the trial court did not
make a finding as to the father's actual income, the case was remanded
to the trial court for further findings.87
VI.

CHILD SUPPORT:

MODIFICATION

The supreme court emphasized the importance of the income
determination made in the divorce decree. In Hulett v. Sutherland,8
the parties divorced in 1997 after settling their case. The decree that
incorporated the parties' settlement agreement included a finding that
the father's monthly income was $4000, and it required the father to pay
$450 per month as child support. In 2002 the mother sought to increase
the child support obligation partially based on the father's increase in
income since the divorce. At trial, the father's income tax returns
convinced the trial court that the father's 1997 income was actually
$81,500. Because the father's annual income at trial was approximately
$74,500, the trial court did not modify the child support award.89
The supreme court held that the $48,000 annual income found in the
parties' divorce decree was binding on the parties, and the father was
not entitled to relitigate the issue. 90 "A judgment . . . shall be conclusive between the same parties ...as to all matters put in issue ...until
the judgment is reversed or set aside." 91 This rule applies to divorce
judgments.92 The case was remanded for further proceedings.9"
In Chung-A-On v. Drury,9 4 the supreme court held that the trial
court properly exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction over the nonresident
father in a child support modification action brought by the mother.95
Due process requires that a nonresident be compelled to answer a
Georgia action only if the nonresident has minimum contacts with the
state, and the exercise of personal jurisdiction "does not offend 'tradition-

85. Id.
86. O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-15(b)(1)-(5) (1999).
87. Eldridge, 259 Ga. App. at 46, 576 S.E.2d at 46 (following recent supreme court
decisions in Urquhart v. Urquhart, 272 Ga. 548, 533 S.E.2d 80 (2000); Eleazar v. Eleazar,
275 Ga. 482, 569 S.E.2d 521 (2002)).
88. 276 Ga. 596, 581 S.E.2d 11 (2003).
89. Id. at 596-97, 581 S.E.2d at 11-12.
90. Id. at 597, 581 S.E.2d at 12.
91. O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 (1993).
92. Cotton v. Cotton, 272 Ga. 276, 528 S.E.2d 255 (2000).
93. Hulett, 276 Ga. at 597, 581 S.E.2d at 12.
94. 276 Ga. 558, 580 S.E.2d 229 (2003).
95. Id. at 558, 580 S.E.2d at 230.
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al notions of fair play and justice."'96 In the instant case, the father
obtained a divorce decree from Georgia in 1990. Four years later, the
father initiated an action to obtain custody of one of his children and to
eliminate his child support obligation for another of the parties'
children.9 7 Finding a relationship between the father's previous
modification action and the current action brought by the mother, the
supreme court determined that it would be appropriate for the father to
expect that he would be brought back to Georgia to address future issues
surrounding his children."

VII.

ATTORNEY FEES

The award of attorney fees in modification cases continues to be a
99
common subject for the court of appeals. In Wehner v. Paris,
the
court of appeals reversed an award of attorney fees and remanded the
issue for a hearing at the trial court level."' The father sought to
reduce his child support obligation, and the mother filed a motion for
summary judgment. The mother sought attorney fees from the father
under O.C.G.A. sections 9-15-141l and 19-9-22.102
Although the
father amended his complaint to seek a modification of child custody, the
trial court granted the mother's summary judgment motion as to the
10 3
modification action and awarded the mother $7500 in attorney fees.
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in awarding
attorney fees without a hearing and without setting forth the award's
statutory basis. 1°4 The mother had the burden to prove that the
attorney fees claimed were in fact incurred and were reasonable.0 5
Further, the father had a right to "confront and challenge the value and
the need for the legal services claimed."' 6 However, the appellate
court rejected the father's claim that attorney fees could not be granted
07
in the case because there was a request to modify child custody.
Because the case began as a modification of child support, attorney fees

96. Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450,453, 330 S.E.2d 706,709 (1985) (adopting the federal
standard set forth in Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
97. 276 Ga. at 558-59, 580 S.E.2d at 229-30.
98. Id. at 559, 580 S.E.2d at 230.
99. 258 Ga. App. 772, 574 S.E.2d 921 (2002).
100. Id. at 773, 574 S.E.2d at 922.
101. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (1998).
102. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-22 (1998).
103. 258 Ga. App. at 772, 574 S.E.2d at 922.
104. Id. at 773, 574 S.E.2d at 922.
105. Id.
106. Id., 574 S.E.2d at 922-23.
107. Id. at 774, 574 S.E.2d at 923.
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were authorized under O.C.G.A. section 19-9-22, a fact unchanged by the
father's amending his complaint to seek child custody.108
Similarly, in Monroe v. Taylor, 0 9 the court of appeals held that
O.C.G.A. section 19-6-1911° permits an award of attorney fees when the
child support modification action is brought as a counterclaim in a
custody modification action."' A counterclaim "stands upon the same
footing as an original claim."1 2 The appellate court further held that
the statute applies to modifications of all child support orders, not only
to the modification of divorce decrees."' Although the statute expressly applies to "petitions filed by either former spouse,"" 4 the appellate
court held that Georgia's public policy treats children born outside of
marriage the same as those born during marriage." 5 Applying the
statute equally to all modification cases, regardless of the existence of a
marriage, as other statutes in Article 6 of Title 19 are applied, furthers
Georgia's public policy." 6
VIII.

LEGITIMATION

More constitutional questions were posed to the supreme court
concerning the legitimation statutes. In Holmes v. Traweek," 7 the
supreme court held that the provision of O.C.G.A. section 19-7-22(a)" 8
allowing the putative father to file a legitimation action in the county of
his own residence was unconstitutional." 9 While the legitimation
statutes do not refer to the mother as a defendant, the mother has most
of the rights afforded to a defendant in a civil case. 20 The mother has
rights that will be infringed upon by the relief sought in a legitimation
action; 12 the mother is entitled to notice of the action; 2 the mother
has the right to object to the legitimation action; 2 3 the mother can

108. Id.
109. 259 Ga. App. 600, 577 S.E.2d 810 (2003).
110. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 (1998).
111. 259 Ga. App. at 603, 577 S.E.2d at 812.
112. Id. at 602, 577 S.E.2d at 812 (quoting Raza v. Swiss Supply Direct, Inc., 256 Ga.
App. 175, 178, 568 S.E.2d 102, 105 (2002)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 601, 577 S.E.2d at 811.
116. Id. at 601-02, 577 S.E.2d at 811-12.
117. 276 Ga. 296, 577 S.E.2d 777 (2003).
118. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(a) (1998).
119. 276 Ga. at 296, 577 S.E.2d at 777.
120. Id. at 297, 577 S.E.2d at 779.
121. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-7-25 (1998)).
122. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22 (b) (1998)).
123. Id. (citing In re Application of Ashmore, 163 Ga. App. 194, 293 S.E.2d 457 (1982)).
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demand a jury trial on the issue of child support;'2 4 and the mother
can appeal the rulings of the court. 2 ' The supreme court concluded
that the mother is a defendant in a legitimation case and held that the
statute's authorization of venue in the county of the putative father's
residence violated the Georgia Constitution's provision that venue shall
be in the county of the defendant's residence. 12 6 The venue provision
of the statute, therefore, was
unconstitutional and was severed from the
12 7
remainder of the statute.
IX.

MARITAL TORTS

The combination of tort claims with divorce cases is becoming more
common. In Beller v. Tilbrook,"2 ' the supreme court reviewed a case
to determine if the wife's personal injury claim against the husband was
barred by the statute of limitations. 2 ' When the parties were dating,
the woman insisted that the man be tested for sexually transmitted
diseases before she would have sexual relations with him. After the man
insisted that he had been tested and was free of any disease, the woman
consented to having sexual relations. Prior to the parties' marriage, the
woman discovered that she had contracted a sexually transmitted
disease. The man denied having the disease or transmitting the disease
to the woman. For years, and well into the parties' marriage the man
continued to deny infecting the woman. Eventually, the man admitted
that he did have the disease and had been the person that infected the
woman. The woman filed for divorce and sought damages for personal
injury."' The man claimed that the personal injury suit was barred
by the two-year 3 1 statute of limitations."2 The trial court rejected
the man's
defense because the parties were in a confidential relation3
ship. '

124. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(f) (1998)).
125. Id. (citing Adamavage v. Holloway, 206 Ga. App. 156, 424 S.E.2d 837 (1992)).
126. Id. at 296-97, 577 S.E.2d at 778-79.
127. Id. at 297, 577 S.E.2d at 779.
128. 275 Ga. 762, 571 S.E.2d 735 (2002).
129. Id. at 762, 571 S.E.2d at 735.
130. The transmission of a sexually transmitted disease is actionable in a personal
injury suit. See Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 333 S.E.2d 852 (1985).
131. The statute of limitations for the tort of transmitting a communicable disease is
two years from the time the disease is contracted. Dalrymple v. Brunswick Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 51 Ga. App. 754, 181 S.E. 597 (1935).
132. Beller, 275 Ga. at 762, 571 S.E.2d at 735.
133. Id.
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On appeal, the supreme court held that the man's false representations amounted to fraud, which tolled the statute of limitations. 3 4 The
confidential relationship of spouses justified the woman's reliance on the
man's representations.1 3 5 Because the woman filed her case within
two years of the date that the man admitted the truth, the supreme
court held that the statute136of limitations had not expired and affirmed
the trial court's judgment.
X.

FAMILY VIOLENCE

The court of appeals reversed a finding of family violence in Buchheit
v. Stinson.137 The child's parents were involved in a custody dispute,
and the court appointed a guardian ad litem. The guardian, acting on
conversations she had with the child, filed a family violence action on
the child's behalf against the mother. In the petition, the guardian
alleged that the mother had hit the child, slapped the child, pulled the
child's hair, and threatened the child. The trial court entered an ex
parte order instructing the sheriff to place the child in the father's
custody. At the contested evidentiary hearing, the child testified that
there was only one slap to her face and three hits on her leg. The
mother testified that the slap was to the child's leg and not to the face.
Both witnesses' testimony indicated the slap was predicated on a
disrespectful statement made by the child. The trial court found that
an act of simple battery and entered a six-month
the slap constituted
3
restraining order. 1
The statutory definitions of "family violence" 39 and "simple battery""4 expressly exclude acts of reasonable corporal punishment.'
The appellate court determined that there was no evidence that the
mother's slap in response to the child's disrespectful behavior was
outside the scope of reasonableness and reversed the finding of family
violence.142

134.
at 597).
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 762-63, 571 S.E.2d at 735-36 (citing Dalrymple, 51 Ga. App. at 755, 181 S.E.
Id., 571 S.E.2d at 735.
Id.
260 Ga. App. 450, 579 S.E.2d 853 (2003).
Id. at 450-52, 579 S.E.2d at 854-55.
O.C.G.A. § 19-13-1 (1999).
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23 (2003).
260 Ga. App. at 453-54, 579 S.E.2d at 856.
Id. at 456, 579 S.E.2d at 857-58.
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